

PROPOSALS FOR EFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR LOW-EMISSION MODERNISATION OF ENERGY SECTOR AND INDUSTRY

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SUPPORT FOR LOW-EMISSION MODERNISATION OF ENERGY SECTOR



LOW-EMISSION TRANSITION CHALLENGES

Large scale of required adjustments

(low-emission transformation of coal monoculture)

Obsolete infrastructure, low-emission options are capital-intensive (required significant investment effort)

Income gap relative to EU average remains significant

- → Lower capability of Polish economy to cover the costs of lowemission modernisation will not disappear in the near future.
- → Similar problems in other New Member States



TWO OPTIONS

Use of ETS revenue to support energy investments in NMS

Modified derogation mechanism



TWO OPTIONS

Use of ETS revenue to support energy investments in NMS

Possible compromise?



Modified derogation mechanism

- full control over mechanism implementation at domestic level
- only investments consistent with longterm emission reduction target will be supported
- smart design needed in order to ensure elastic mechanism, which mitigates the risk of wasted support if market conditions change



TWO OPTIONS

Use of ETS revenue to support energy investments in NMS

- creating domestic low-emission investment (modernisation) funds in the NMS
- Investment fund effectively reduces energy price component which covers CAPEX → price shock is smaller
- does not differ significantly from currently used solutions
- flexible mechanism –possibility to realocate funds between sectors and project types

Modified derogation mechanism



First-best solution

IF

clear rules are set ex ante, including interaction with state aid rules and scale is adequate



FOCUS ON MODERNISATION FUND

Challenges for energy sector intervention

- How to integrate the fund into already complex market w/o unnecessary distortions?
- What about the state aid rules?

Possible solution:

The fund covers part of other policy instruments' costs

(which are normally included in the energy bill)

- Examples: costs of RES auctions, capacity mechanisms, CHP support schemes
- Funds allocated by the Member States according to their preferences and changing domestic circumstances
- Avoiding conflicts EC-MS: the list of allowed types of supported instruments needs to be agreed ex ante





The fund as a promising option for negotiations:

- ✓ Key mechanism not dependent on the results of discussion on the future of energy market.
 - Whatever the rules and allowed instruments will be, CAPEX support via co-financing of other policy instruments decreases energy prices and enables modernisation.
- Additionality of CAPEX support allows the NMS to make their own bet on preferred energy mix while ensuring that the fund will finance only energy options which lower emissions.
 - For example, the fund might co-finance RES auctions and support for nuclear investments, while costs of the capacity market for fossil-based generators could be covered only by domestic consumers.



FOCUS ON MODERNISATION FUND

Example: what does 86-10-4 mean for Poland?

For 10 years

	EUAs for auctions by source	Central ETS revenue scenario, bn EUR
Historic emissions 86%	65%	17,2
Solidarity 10%	25%	6,7
Modernisation 4%	10%	2,7

Our estimates: 1,5 bn PER YEAR additional investment needed in low-emission scenario

Assumptions:

EC climate goal proposal (40% reduction)

Solidarity mechanism - continued

Modernisation fund - split among NMS proportionally to solidarity mechanism

EUA price rising from 10 EUR in 2021 to 50 EUR in 2030

1,5 bn EUA removed from market 2021-2030



FOCUS ON MODERNISATION FUND

Alternative – greater focus on the investment:

For 10 years

	EUAs for auctions by source	Central ETS revenue scenario, bn EUR
Historic emissions 86%	65%	17,2
Solidarity 6%	15%	4
Modernisation 8%	20%	5,4

1/3 of the additional investment

Another perspective – total investment burden:

3-4 bn EUR per year

total excessive investment burden for NMS (above EU average)= 14-17% of all auctioned EUAs = 7-9% of all EUAs

→ Even higher EUA price? Extended ETS?



SMART INDUSTRY PROTECTION FOR EFFECTIVE LOW-EMISSION TRANSITION

CARBON LEAKAGE RISK IN EMISSION-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES

Problems:

- Risk of carbon leakage increases over time
- Ambitious benchmarks are automatically decreased over time and through cross-sectoral correction factor
- Breakthrough technologies are the long-term answer
- What about short- and mid-term perspectives for industry?

Solution:

 Make benchmarks realistic and resign from correction factor, especially in case of process emissions

CARBON LEAKAGE RISK IN **EMISSION-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES**



Problem:

Ex ante allocation:

- does not take into account production variability accurately
- distorts the incentives for plant operators
- creates opportunity for windfall profits from pass-through
- amplifies the benchmarking problem (sharp increase of marginal costs)

Solution:

 Move from ex ante allocation of free allowances to production-based ex post allocation

CARBON LEAKAGE RISK IN EMISSION-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES



Problem:

• How to ensure that overall emission cap is not exceeded if we introduce realistic benchmark and ex post allocation?

Solution:

 Use part of the allowances surplus to create a reserve that would enable to fix the carbon leakage protection without violating the total cap (→ less allowances moved to MSR)

The scale is adequate

Allowances surplus > 2 bn EUA
Industry estimate for shortage of allowances 2013-30 = 1 bn EUA
(Eurofer)

CARBON LEAKAGE RISK IN EMISSION-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES





Holistic approach to the carbon leakage protection reform is crucial

CARBON LEAKAGE RISK IN ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES



Problem:

 Differentiated willingness and capacity of the MS to compensate for indirect costs of ETS to energy-intensive industries

Solution:

 Create the ETS-based centralised mechanism for protection of energy-intensive industries in the EU


CARBON LEAKAGE RISK IN ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES



Problem:

Different energy mixes →
 different average/marginal
 electricity emission intensity
 ratios in energy sectors across
 the EU → different
 contribution of the MS to the
 centralised mechanism

Average/marginal electricity emission intensity ratios across the EU



Solution:

Source: own elaboration based on EC and IEA data

 Compensate the excessive burden on countries with relatively high average/marginal electricity emission intensity ratios during the allocation of the EAU for auctioning between the MS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION



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